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Abstract. A number of analogies to cryptographic concepts have been
made about watermarking. In this paper, we argue that these analogies
are misleading or incorrect, and highlight several analogies to support our
argument. We believe that the fundamental role of watermarking is the
reliable embedding and detection of information and should therefore be
considered a form of communications. We note that the ﬁelds of commu-
nications and cryptography are quite distinct and while communications
systems often combine technologies from the two ﬁelds, a layered architec-
ture is applied that requires no knowledge of the layers above. We discuss
how this layered approach can be applied to watermarking applications.
1 Introduction
Digital watermarking has received considerable attention as a complement to
cryptography for the protection of digital content such as music, video and
images. Cryptography provides a means for secure delivery of content to the
consumer. Legitimate consumers are explicitly or implicitly provided with a key
to decrypt the content in order to view or listen to it. Unfortunately, not all
legitimate consumers are trustworthy and an untrustworthy consumer may alter
or copy the decrypted content in a manner that is not permitted by the con-
tent owner. However, cryptography provides no protection once the content is
decrypted, which is required for human perception. Watermarking complements
cryptography by embedding a message within the content. If properly designed,
the message remains in the content after decryption and, more importantly, af-
ter digital-to-analog and analog-to-digital conversion. By so doing, watermarking
can be used to close the ‘analog hole’1.
1 Not only must the digital content be decrypted, but it must also be converted to an
analog signal in order for a person to see or hear it. This gives rise to the ‘analog hole’,
which refers to the fact that all digital protection is lost at the point of perception.
And this analog signal may be re-digitized by an untrustworthy consumer in order
to obtain an unprotected digital copy of the content.
Y.Q. Shi and B. Jeon (Eds.): IWDW 2006, LNCS 4283, pp. 1–15, 2006.
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Since the primary motivation for watermarking has been for security, numer-
ous analogies have been made between watermarking and cryptography. In this
paper, we argue that many of these analogies are for the moment misleading or
incorrect. We argue that watermarking should only be viewed as a means for re-
liably embedding and decoding information hidden in a cover Work. As such, it
is a communication system, often modeled as spread spectrum communications
or communications with side information. A system incorporating watermarking
may also use cryptography but we argue that, up to now, a layered model has
been much more successful than intermingling the two concepts.
To support our argument, we ﬁrst provide a brief introduction to key concepts
in communications (Section 2) and cryptography (Section 3). We then discuss
the security requirements associated with watermarking. Section 4 highlights
a number of cryptographic analogies used within the watermarking community
and discusses the weaknesses of these analogies. A contrario, Section 5 shows that
the layered model oﬀers much safer designs with the examples of watermarking-
based content authentication and watermarking-based traitor tracing. The last
section extends this discussion to signal processing other than watermarking.
2 Communications
Communications is concerned with reliable transmission of a message from Alice
to Bob over an unreliable channel. A channel is considered unreliable if there is
a ﬁnite probability that an error will occur between the points of transmission
and reception, e.g. Alice sends a ‘0’-bit, but Bob decodes a ‘1’-bit. Reliable com-
munications is concerned with bandwidth, power or signal-to-noise ratio (SNR),
channel coding and bit error rate (BER).
It was, of course, Shannon [1] who showed that the maximum rate of error
free transmission, i.e. the channel capacity (in bits per second), is given by:
C = 2B log2
(
1 +
s
n
)
(1)
where B denotes bandwidth in hertz, and s and n the signal and white Gaussian
noise powers respectively. In order to approach this limit, it is necessary to
encode the message m, prior to transmission. This channel code provides a level
of redundancy that is measured by the code rate, R. For example, if every k-
bits of the message are represented by an n-bit code, then the rate is R = k/n,
where n > k. Finally the BER is a direct measure of the error rate achieved by
a particular code and is usually plotted as a function of the SNR.
The sources of bit errors are many. The most common error model is Gaus-
sian noise, but there are many other error sources. However, all such sources
are usually considered to be naturally occurring and not due to the eﬀects of
an adversary. In fact, it is very rare for a civilian communications system to
consider a hostile channel. However, military communications must do so. In a
hostile military environment, the two primary concerns are (i) jamming and (ii)
detection. Jamming refers to attempts by an active adversary to prevent Bob re-
ceiving a signal. Detection refers to an adversary’s eﬀorts to detect (and localize)
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enemy communications. If this is successfully achieved then military ﬁrepower
may be used to destroy the communications. Note that at this level, the concern
is with the delivery of bits, not with the security of the bits (which is discussed
in the next section). Secure communication is irrelevant if Bob never receives
the communications!
Spread spectrum (SS) communications was originally developed to protect
military communications from detection and jamming [2], although it is now
widely used in many civilian applications, e.g. mobile phones. The basic princi-
ple behind SS communications is that each message bit is multiplied by a (pseudo
random) chip sequence that spreads the message bit over a much broader spec-
trum. For example, consider an implementation of SS communications based
on frequency hopping. Here, the original message bit is transmitted as n lower
power bits (the chip sequence), each of which is transmitted over a separate
frequency band that is pseudo-randomly chosen. The receiver is synchronized
with the transmitter and also has knowledge of the pseudo-random sequence of
frequency bands being used. Thus, Bob is able to sum the lower energy in each
of the individual bands to produce a good signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the
receiver.
However, an adversary has much greater diﬃculty detecting the transmission,
since Eve does not know the pseudo-random frequency hopping sequence. If Eve
monitors just one frequency band, she cannot be conﬁdent that there is any
communication, since the signal transmitted is very weak and only persists for
a short time. Furthermore, Eve cannot jam the channel as a precaution against
possible communications. This is because the power needed to conﬁdently jam
all the frequency channels would be impractically large.
Another communications model that has received recent interest is known as
communications with side information. Here the channel has two noise sources,
both of which are unknown to the receiver, but the ﬁrst of which is entirely known
to the transmitter. Under these circumstances, which arise in mobile telephony
and digital watermarking, how much information can Alice reliably transmit to
Bob? Costa [3] proved that the channel capacity is the same as if the ﬁrst noise
source is absent.
3 Cryptography
Cryptography is concerned with the secure transmission of a message from a
sender, Alice, to a recipient, Bob, over an insecure channel. A channel is consid-
ered insecure if the bits sent by Alice may be read or altered by an adversary,
Eve, prior to receipt by Bob. It is important to realize that an insecure channel
is not an unreliable channel. In fact, cryptography often assumes reliable com-
munications, i.e. Bob receives exactly the same bits sent by either Alice or Eve
- there are no unintentional errors.
A secure transmission is concerned with (i) privacy, (ii) integrity and (iii)
authentication. Privacy is concerned with ensuring that an adversary, Eve, can
learn nothing about the message intended for Bob, by examining the encrypted
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bits sent by Alice. Integrity is concerned with ensuring that Bob can be conﬁdent
that the message has not been altered by Eve prior to receipt. And authentication
is concerned with guaranteeing that the sender of the message is actually Alice
and not an impostor.
To ensure privacy, cryptography assumes the existence of an encryption func-
tion , E(.), which takes a message, m, and a key, K, and outputs an encrypted
message, c, i.e. c = E(m,K). It further assumes a decryption function, D(.) that
takes an encrypted message, c and a key, K, and outputs a cleartext message,
m, i.e. m = D(c,K) = D(E(m,K),K).
Shannon [4] deﬁned perfect security as an encryption function in which an
adversary, Eve, learns nothing about the message, m, by inspection of the ci-
phertext, c. Perfect security can be realized using a one-time pad. Unfortunately,
a one-time pad is not practical in most situations. Consequently, modern cryptog-
raphy is therefore concerned with the design of cryptographic algorithms which
approximate perfect security while re-using a shared key, K. It is assumed that
the encryption and decryption algorithms are known to all parties, including
the adversary, Eve. This is known as Kerckhoﬀs’ Principle [5] and reduces Eve’s
cryptanalysis problem to inferring the key, K.
If the length of the binary key is n-bits, the total number of keys is 2n and is
called the keyspace. For suﬃciently large n, the keyspace is enormous and ex-
haustive enumeration or brute force search is infeasible. Note that cryptography
assumes that Eve learns nothing about the true key, K, by trying a key, K ′,
that is close to K in the sense of say Hamming distance. In other words, if Alice
encodes a message twice, once using key, K and once using a key, K ′, that diﬀers
by only one bit from K, then the two encrypted ciphertexts will be completely
diﬀerent with no correlation between them. In reality, modern cryptographic
algorithms only approximate these assumptions.
Cryptographic systems in which the encryption and decryption algorithm
share the same key are known as symmetric key or private key systems. One
problem with such is how to initiate the system, i.e. how do Alice and Bob agree
on a key without sharing this knowledge with Eve? Public key or asymmetric
key cryptography solves this problem by assigning two keys to each individual:
a public one (PK) that is published on a database and a secret one (SK) which
is never disclosed. Everybody knows the public key of everybody. The main fea-
ture of public key watermarking lies in the asymmetry of the keys used during
encryption and decryption, namely m = D(E(m,PK), SK). For instance, Alice
can encrypt the message she wishes to transmit with Bob’s public key (PKB).
The resulting ciphertext c = E(m,PKB) can then only be decrypted with Bob’s
secret key (SKB) i.e. by Bob himself. In other words, the message m has been
sent securely without agreeing on a secret key beforehand2.
Integrity is guaranteed through the use of another cryptographic primitive
known as a one-way hash function. This is a function that takes an arbitrarily
2 However, for practical reasons, public key cryptography is usually used to exchange
a key at the beginning of a transmission. The subsequent messages are then en-
crypted/decrypted with a private key crypto-system using the agreed session key.
Watermarking Is Not Cryptography 5
long bit sequence (the pre-image) and outputs a constant length bit sequence
known as a hash or digest. The characteristics of a hash function are:
1. it is easy to compute the hash value given a pre-image,
2. it is computationally unfeasible to generate a pre-image that hashes to a
particular value,
3. it is hard to generate two pre-images with the same hash value, and
4. a single bit change in the pre-image results in a major change of the hash
value.
The properties of a hash make it well-suited for guaranteeing the integrity of a
message and the authenticity of its sender. For instance, Alice computes a hash
of her message concatenated with the shared secret key, K, and appends the hash
to the end of the message. This is one way to make what cryptographers call
a message authentication code (MAC). Note that the message need not be en-
crypted if privacy is not an issue. On receipt, Bob can take the received message
and compute the hash of the received message concatenated with their shared
secret key. If this recomputed hash is identical to the hash appended by Alice,
then Bob can be conﬁdent that the message has not been tampered with. While
Eve may alter the unencrypted message, she is unable to compute the associated
hash since Eve does not know the key shared by Alice and Bob. Consequently,
any alteration made by Eve will be detected by Bob. Digital signatures combine
hashing and public key encryption to guarantee a better authenticity and non
repudiation while easing the key management.
4 Digital Watermarking
The most basic requirement of a digital watermarking system is the ability to
embed and decode a message hidden within a cover Work. Applications of digital
watermarking may require very much more. However, all systems need a reliable
mechanism for embedding and decoding message bits3. We therefore believe
that digital watermarking is fundamentally a form of communications and, as
such, is primarily concerned with the reliable transmission of a message over an
unreliable channel.
Of course, applications of digital watermarking also have security concerns.
Security threats depend on the watermark application. However, the categories
of attacks that have been identiﬁed are:
1. Unauthorized embedding,
2. Unauthorized decoding, and
3. Unauthorized removal.
Since much of the motivation for watermarking is driven by security concerns,
it is not surprising that analogies have been made between watermarking and
3 Even fragile watermarks must provide a reliable communications channel in the
absence of distortions.
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cryptography. However, while there are superﬁcial similarities, we believe that
most of these analogies are ﬂawed. As an example, let us consider keyspaces in
watermarking and cryptography.
4.1 The Keyspace Analogy
Some articles have studied the security of watermarking schemes with infor-
mation theoretical tools [6,7,8], and especially equivocation. Here we rephrase
this analysis in a simpler manner, thanks to a keyspace analogy. This analogy
assumes that a watermarking technique is reliable because it is keyed by a n-
sample sequence just like a crypto-system keyed by a n-bit secret. This analysis
is not generic, we only consider the example of SS.
The security of a crypto-system is usually assessed by a common feature:
the keyspace. The key θ randomly chosen from a keyspace Θ is usually a binary
string made of n bits. An adversary without any a priori knowledge of the secret
key can simply exhaustively test all the elements of the keyspace. This strategy
is referred to as a brute force attack. The size of the keyspace is |Θ| = 2n. For
each tested element, the probability P that it is equal to secret key is P = 2−n
or log2(P ) = −n. In other words, the larger the number of bits in the key, the
lower is this probability P and the more time will be required to disclose the
secret θ. For large n, say n = 256, the probability is negligibly small.
The concept of a key has been adopted by the watermarking community.
For example, in spread spectrum watermarking, the key is used as a seed to a
pseudo-random number generator that creates a binary antipodal sequence used
as a carrier or chip sequence. Alternatively, the key may directly refer to the chip
sequence. Nevertheless the behaviour of these two keyspaces is very diﬀerent!
First, the 2n possible antipodal binary sequences are not all eligible to serve
as spread spectrum chip sequences. For instance, zero-average chip sequences
are preferred to avoid aﬀecting the direct component (DC) of the host signal,
e.g. the average brightness of an image. This constraint reduces the number of
possible keys to (in terms of bits):
log2 |Θ| = log2
(
n
n/2
)
 n− 1
2
log2(n). (2)
The approximation in (2) shows that despite this constraint, the size of the set
is almost exponential and thus not drastically reduced.
However, there is a second, more serious diﬀerence with cryptography: the
secret carrier does not need to be exactly disclosed in order to break the water-
marking system. An attacker simply needs a close enough estimate! The more
correlated the attacker’s estimate is to the true chip sequence (i.e. secret key),
the less distortion is required to remove the watermark. Indeed, practical studies
have shown that a normalised correlation greater or equal to ρmin = 0.4 between
the attacker’s estimate and the true key, is suﬃcient to remove a watermark
while maintaining good perceptual quality [6].
In other words, if at least kmin = n(ρmin + 1)/2 samples of the estimated
carrier match the ones of the secret carrier, the attack will be successful. Keeping
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in mind that half these ‘matching samples’ need to be 1’s to preserve the zero
average, the probability P that a randomly picked eligible carrier leads to a
successful attack is given by:
P =
∑
kmin≤k≤n
k even
(
n/2
k/2
)2/(
n
n/2
)
. (3)
Numerical computations show that log2(P ) ≈ −0.12n bits for ρmin = 0.4.
This is a remarkable diﬀerence! In simple terms, the cryptanalyst looks for
the one and only unique secret key among 2n eligible elements, whereas the
watermark hacker looks for one of the 20.88n/
√
n suitable carriers among a set
of 2n/
√
n, i.e. the search space is only 20.12n.
Furthermore, we note that it has been proven that information about the
secret key leaks from watermarked content (at least for spread spectrum [6]
and lattice quantization index modulation [9] watermarking schemes). Thus,
observations of watermarked content give the pirate strong a priori knowledge
with which to estimate the key.
The keyspace analogy shows that the belief (a n-sample watermarking carrier
provides as much security as a n-bit cryptographic key) is clearly ﬂawed and
highly misleading.
4.2 The Public Key Analogy
As discussed in Section 3, public key cryptography provides a mechanism for
Alice and Bob to initiate a secure communication without ﬁrst having to share
a secret key. In watermarking, we would like to permit an untrustworthy third
party, Eve, to read a watermark embedded in a Work. However, if we grant this
capability, we do not want Eve to be able to remove the watermark from the
content. The capability to read-but-not-remove, is almost a holy grail of digital
watermarking.
Unfortunately, as of the time of writing, there is neither a theoretical proof
on the feasibility of this capability, nor a practical watermark algorithm, that
we are aware of.
Indeed, a number of papers have been published [10,11,12] that seek to create
read-but-not-remove watermarking systems based on an analogy to public key
cryptography. The analogy is that the embedder will embed the watermark with
one key, and the detector will detect the watermark with another. Since these
two keys are diﬀerent, perhaps this will prevent an adversary with a detector
from removing the watermark.
This analogy is not just ﬂawed, it is wrong [13]. It is true that these schemes
provide a better robustness against average attack, Principal Component Anal-
ysis (PCA), and oracle attack. However, the disclosure of the detection key per-
mits specialized closest-point attacks that prevent detection while maintaining
a good perceptual quality [14]. Hence, they are bad candidates for providing the
read-but-not-remove capability. This proves that asymmetry is not suﬃcient, and
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Fig. 1. Layered architecture for watermarking systems: a cryptographic primitive is
simply added on top of the watermarking algorithm to provide security
indeed, it is not sure that it is even necessary to achieve the read-but-not-remove
capability [15].
5 The Layered Approach
We believe that a layered approach to the design of secure watermarking systems,
rather than an intermingling of the two ﬁelds of watermarking and cryptography,
better ensures security for most applications.
We call a layered architecture a system where cryptography and watermarking
primitives are well separated, as depicted in Figure 1, to implement a complete
watermarking system. This approach is ﬁrst motivated by its similarity with
the popular open systems interconnection model (OSI model [16]). Using the
OSI terminology, the information hiding layer is represented by the session layer
(synchronization), the transport layer (error correction) and the physical layer
(transmission). The presentation layer (encryption) is overlaid on top and the
cleartext can be retrieved at the highest layer. Indeed, the ‘encryption’ box
in Figure 1 has to be understood in a wide sense: the watermarking algorithm
receives as input, the output of any cryptographic primitive, not only encryption.
These two layers have very diﬀerent levels of security. The lower level, wa-
termarking, has no security in the cryptographic sense. That is, it provides no
protection with respect to privacy, authentication or integrity. It is only con-
cerned with the reliably transmitting the (encrypted) bits. Since security for
watermarking encompasses not just cryptographic security, (privacy, authenti-
cation, integrity), but also detection and removal, it is almost always the weakest
link, as illustrated in Section 4.1 by the keyspace analogy.
Assume that cryptography is inﬁnitely more secure than watermarking. Hid-
ing a ciphertext, as depicted in Figure 1, forbids unauthorized embedding and
decoding. However, it is absolutely useless against watermark removal or jam-
ming. Hence, the layered approach does not necessarily bring a higher security
level. However, it clearly separates the functionality of the two complementary
technologies and reduces the risk of applying an inappropriate technique to solve
a speciﬁc security issue.
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5.1 Case Studies
Content Authentication. In this context, the goal is to ensure that the pro-
tected content has not been tampered with. Both cryptography and watermark-
ing oﬀer a technical solution to this challenge. Nevertheless, each one of them
has its own shortcoming.
In cryptography, authentication is achieved by appending a digital signature
or MAC to the content. However, ‘appending’ something to the content intro-
duces an overhead i.e. more information has to be transmitted. And there is the
risk that the MAC may be “lost” during format conversions.
Early proposals in watermarking suggested to embed a client-dependent wa-
termark in the content. For example, the least signiﬁcant bits (LSB) of an image
are set to match a speciﬁc pseudo-random sequence. In this case, the drawback
is that the watermark signal is not dependent of the protected content and can
be copied to another one [17].
Combining both technologies immediately comes to mind as a means to avoid
these shortcomings. One can indeed embed a watermark which encodes the dig-
ital signature or MAC of the content. When receiving a content, the user simply
has to compare the digital signature of the content with the one stored by water-
marking to validate the authenticity of the document. In this case, the watermark
can no longer be copied from one content to the other because the watermark
is now content-dependent. Moreover, no overhead is introduced. The only cau-
tion to be taken is that the watermarking process should not modify the bits
of the content used to compute the digital signature of MAC. For instance, if
the watermark is embedded in the LSB of an image, the digital signature should
only be computed on the 7 most signiﬁcant bits (MSB) of the pixels in the
image.
A cryptographic hash provides exact authentication: a single bit change and
the content is reported to be corrupted. In practice, a more ﬂexible authenti-
cation of multimedia content may be desired to account for the various signal
processing primitives (ﬁltering, lossy compressions, etc) that do not modify the
semantic meaning of the content. This has led to the introduction of ‘robust
hash functions’ which will be further described in Section 6.1.
Traitor Tracing. In a typical ﬁngerprinting scenario, Alice owns a few high
valued multimedia items and wants to distribute these to a large number of
customers. However, she is concerned that one or more of the customers may
illegally redistribute her assets, thus inducing a loss of revenues. To address this
issue, Alice introduces some customer-dependent modiﬁcations before distribut-
ing her assets. If a copy is found on an illegal distribution network, Alice looks
for these modiﬁcations which serve as a ﬁngerprint to trace back the ‘traitor’
who has broken his/her license agreement. Knowing Alice’s strategy, a small
set of users, usually referred to as a collusion set, may compare their individ-
ual copies, detect where they diﬀer and create a new copy which potentially no
longer contains a valid ﬁngerprint. Alice’s goal is then to design her system so
that she can cope with such behaviours.
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Traitor tracing has been studied by cryptographers where the problem is usu-
ally cast as the design of collusion-secure codes. A fundamental hypothesis is
that, in combining their ﬁngerprinted versions, a collusion inherently obeys a
rule, called the marking assumption [18]. The most common marking assump-
tion is that the set of colluders can only alter those bits of the codeword that
diﬀer between colluders. That is, those bits of each colluder’s ﬁngerprint (code-
word) that are identical for all the colluders remain unchanged after a collusion
attack. This assumption leads to the notion of a feasible set, also referred to
as set of descendants, which is the collection of ﬁngerprints that the collusion
may produce. Traitor tracing needs collusion-secure codes designed so that each
element in the feasible set can be linked back to at least one of the colluders as
long as the number of colluders does not exceed a given limit.
Many recent ﬁngerprinting solutions follow a layered architecture [19]. The
cryptographic customer-dependent collusion-secure codeword is the payload em-
bedded by the watermarking algorithm, and digital watermarking is simply ex-
ploited as a means to transmit the customer ﬁngerprint, from one point to the
other.
5.2 Knowledge of Lower Layers
In a layered model, the layers below do not need to know about the layers above.
A function at layer i will accept inputs from layers above, but the function does
not need to know how the inputs or outputs are interpreted by the layers above.
However, the design and implementation of layers above may need a knowledge
and understanding of the lower level protocols.
To illustrate this, let us re-examine the problemof traitor tracing4. Themarking
assumption on which collusion-secure codes are based is a model of the errors that
can occur once the ﬁngerprint is transmitted. These errors occur within the lower
layers and can therefore be considered as a model of the ‘noise’ present in these
levels. The most common marking assumption assumes that the set of colluders
cannot alter those bits of the codewords that are common across all colluders.
We believe that this marking assumption is valid for watermarking algorithms
that embed each bit of the ﬁngerprint independently. For example, standard
spread spectrum (SS) and quantization index modulation (QIM) techniques ﬁt
this model very well. However, more recent watermarking algorithms introduce
dependency between successive embedded symbols in order to achieve higher
embedding rates [23,24]. Thus, if one bit it altered, this may result in multiple
successive bit errors at the decoder. Under these circumstances, the marking
assumption would no longer be valid. For example, if two colluders are assigned
two ﬁngerprints that diﬀer in only one bit, then the marking assumption states
that all the remaining bits should be preserved. However, this one bit error may
introduce a burst error at the decoder. Therefore, the extracted codeword may
diﬀer in bits that are common to both colluders.
4 We will assume that the information hiding layer is secure enough to avoid estimation
attacks [20,6]. In other words, a proper key scheduling policy [21,22] is enforced to
prevent information leakage and subsequent jamming of the watermarking channel.
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This example highlights the need for the upper levels to understand the work-
ings of the lower levels. If a lower level watermarking algorithm is based on SS or
QIM, then traditional collusion codes are applicable. However, if the lower level
watermarking algorithm is based on dirty paper trellis coding, then a diﬀerent
type of collusion code must be designed and used.
6 Extension to Other Signal Processing
We would like to end this paper by considering the relationships between cryp-
tography and signal processing other than watermarking.
6.1 Robust Hash
Section 5.1 has highlighted the need for ‘ﬂexible’ hash functions which would
output the same binary hash for perceptually similar contents. The quest for
such a functionality has been previously explored in multimedia indexing and
biometrics. This is usually referred to as ‘robust hash’, perceptual hash, soft
hash or passive ﬁngerprint [25,26].
Ideally, a robust hash would have the properties of:
1. it is easy to compute the hash value given a pre-image,
2. it is computationally unfeasible to generate a pre-image that hashes to a
particular value,
3. it is hard to generate two perceptually diﬀerent pre-images with the same
hash value, and
4. only a perceptually signiﬁcant change to the pre-image results in a change
to the hash value.
Only the last two properties are diﬀerent from the deﬁnition of a hash provided in
Section 3. Nevertheless, the notions of “perceptually diﬀerent” and “perceptually
signiﬁcant change” are very diﬃcult to deﬁne.
Many researchers have attempted to realize a robust hash by designing com-
pletely new ‘hash’ functions. However, the design of hash functions is very diﬃ-
cult as revealed by incremental works [27,28]. Even cryptographic hash functions
such as MD3 and SHA-1 have recently been shown to be partially ﬂawed.
A layered approach would continue to use a cryptographic hash. The robust
hash would be built on top of the cryptographic hash in a manner proposed
by [29]. In such a design, the robust hash accepts the input content, e.g. an
image, and extracts a robust representation of the content. It is this robust rep-
resentation that is crytographically hashed. And it is this robust representation
that is only altered if the input content is perceptually altered. The advantage
of this layered solution is obvious. First, we can utilized well-know and trusted
cryptographic tools. And second, we can utilize the considerable body of work
regarding robust representations of signals. Finally, if the robust hash fails, we
know it must be a failure of the robust representation. However, without a layered
approach, errors are more likely and their causes more diﬃcult to determine.
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6.2 Signal Processing in the Encrypted Domain
Traditionally signal processing has been applied prior to encryption. In fact, for
many encryption algorithms, it would make no sense to apply signal processing
to the encrypted signal. The result would be nonsense. However, there is re-
cent interest in developing encryption algorithms that permit signal processing
of the encrypted signal. The motivation stems from the need to perform signal
processing operations on machines that may not be trusted. For example, when
streaming encrypted content over the Web, proxy servers may need to perform
transcoding in order to reduce the bandwidth of the signal to match the recipi-
ent’s (ﬂuctuating) channel capacity. However, the proxy server is not trusted by
the content owner who therefore does not wish the proxy server to decrypt the
signal prior to transcoding5.
We do not believe that this paradigm breaks the layered model. Rather, the
processing of the encrypted signal should occur above the encryption layer. At
the signal processing layer, there is a need to understand the nature of the en-
cryption algorithm in order to design properly functioning algorithms. However,
from the lower level encryption/decryption perspective, it is irrelevant what sig-
nal processing has occurred between encryption and decryption, provided the
resulting signal can be correctly decrypted.
7 Conclusion
The interest in digital watermarking is strongly motivated by multimedia secu-
rity issues. Consequently, it is not surprising that a number of cryptographic
analogies have been applied to watermarking. However, we have argued that
many of these cryptographic analogies are misleading or incorrect.
To support our argument we examined the concept of keys used in both cryp-
tography and watermarking and showed that their properties are very diﬀerent.
In particular, for spread spectrum watermarking, an n-bit key has a keyspace of
only 20.12n which is very much less than the equivalent keyspace in cryptogra-
phy. We also discussed the concept of public key watermarking and argued that
this concept, i.e. read-but-not-write, does not arise from using diﬀerent keys for
embedding and detection.
Fundamentally, watermarking is communications and is therefore concerned
with the reliable delivery of bits over an unreliable channel. This is not a problem
that is addressed by cryptography. However, cryptography does have a role to
play in the development of applications of watermarking. Speciﬁcally, well-known
cryptographic algorithms can be used to guarantee the privacy, authenticity
and integrity of messages embedded in multimedia content. However watermark
security must also consider the threat of unauthorized removal, for which there
is no cryptographic solution.
5 This problem has been considered in [30]. However, their proposed solution does not
require signal processing of the encrypted stream. Rather, the stream is split into
several layers that are independently encrypted. Then, if transcoding is required, the
high-resolution stream can simply be deleted.
Watermarking Is Not Cryptography 13
As in traditional communication systems, we recommend the use of a layered
architecture. In such a design, watermarking is responsible for the synchroniza-
tion and delivery of bits while cryptography is responsible for guaranteeing their
privacy, integrity and authenticity. This separation simpliﬁes analysis and mod-
iﬁcation of application systems.
To demonstrate this, we discussed two application areas: content authentica-
tion and traitor tracing. We explained how a layered design using cryptography
and watermarking can be used to provide for both exact and approximate au-
thentication (robust hash). Our discussion of traitor tracing served to highlight
the point that in a layered architecture it may be necessary for the higher layers
to understand the details of the lower levels. However, the lower level functions
do not need to know how the upper layers will interpret signals.
We brieﬂy commented on the recent interest in applying signal processing to
encrypted signals and observed that such an approach can still be accommodated
within a layered framework.
In summary, we hope this paper has clearly distinguished the roles of digital
watermarking and cryptography and encouraged the use of a layered framework
to the design of watermarking applications. We hope that these considerations
will be taken into account in future proposals to combine cryptograpy and wa-
termarking, together with other rules of good design [31].
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